reasoning under oppression

Patterns of attention and inattention reveal explanatorily robust information about cognitive architecture and behaviors in social and cognitive practices. This work explores an overlooked feature of our mental habits, particularly, when we are unaware, oblivious, or ignorant about relevant information in social environments.

Omissions in Social Attention (under review; draft available upon request):

This paper develops an account of omissions as epistemically significant features of cognition. Drawing on a functionalist framework inspired by Fodor and recent theories of attention, I argue that inattention and omissions are not mere absences but structured elements with mental architecture that determine which representations become epistemically operative. Through the case of an inattentive driver who overlooks a cyclist, I show how omissions can shape what counts as evidence in both individual and social contexts. Empirical research on inattentional blindness and social salience supports the view that unconscious attentional processes contour the scope of epistemic justification. Inattention can produce epistemically diminished outcomes by constraining access to relevant information. From these considerations, I conclude that an epistemology of attention must also be an epistemology of inattention.

Trauma as epistemic skill. In Bez Micol and Gardiner, Georgi (eds.) The Philosophy of Sexual Violence. Routledge. forthcoming

This paper challenges the prevailing ‘Epistemic Deficit Thesis,’ which holds that trauma systematically produces epistemically faulty reasoning—manifesting in memory suppression, self-deception, and impaired moral judgment. Against this deficit model, I argue that trauma can also generate epistemic skill and epistemic grit: forms of rational resilience that refine rather than undermine epistemic agency. Through the case of hyper-vigilance, I show that trauma responses can exemplify a kind of epistemic expertise grounded in transformational experiences rather than habitual mastery. Drawing on debates about skill (Ryle, Dreyfus) and transformative experience (L.A. Paul), I develop an account of trauma responses as an immediately acquired, attention-based epistemic capacity. I further argue that survivor’s perseverance in inquiry—what Paul and Morton call “grit”—can constitute epistemic resilience rather than irrational evidence resistance. Taken together, these insights reconfigure the epistemology of trauma. Rather than a site of malfunction, it can reveal overlooked dimensions of rationality, responsibility, and the costs of certain epistemic norms themselves.

Epistemic Authority and Oppression: an account of expertise (draft available upon request):

Standard debates in standpoint theory face a dilemma: if the oppressed possess epistemic authority by virtue of social location, they appear vulnerable to false consciousness; yet if social identity is epistemically irrelevant, the distinctive credibility of the oppressed dissolves. This paper reconceives epistemic authority in the context of oppression. I argue that the tension stems from an impoverished model of expertise that centralizes identity rather than epistemic skill. Drawing on attention-based account of perception and skill, I propose the connoisseur view: expertise arises from trained patterns of attention that attune agents to socially salient features of their environment. On this view, the oppressed are epistemic connoisseurs of their lived experiences. That is, they are experts not because of social location, but because oppression necessitates the cultivation of certain attentional patterns. Further, this framework distinguishes oppression from marginalization, where the latter but not the former is susceptible to the claim that the oppressed unduly suffer from false consciousness.

closed-mindedness

My research on omissions and ignorance generates further questions about the bounds of permissibility for absent states. Are such states always problematic?  To answer this question, I explore the nature of closed-mindedness as a case study for permissible unawareness. Determining the bounds of permissibility requires an account of relevance. This paper contributes to this requirement by introducing two novel conditions for relevance in inquiry.

Closed-mindedness as a defensible fortress of mind (under review; draft available upon request):

Closed-mindedness is typically treated as an epistemic vice, the antithesis of open inquiry. Yet, I argue that under certain conditions, closed-mindedness can be epistemically acceptable—even rational. Focusing on inquiry rather than belief revision, this paper advances a normative account of acceptable closed-mindedness ground in relevance. When an inquirer is ignorance about an intellectual option that is irrelevant to their question, their closed-mindedness does not constitute an epistemic failing. I develop three interlocking norms of relevance—the at-issue, probative, and pervasiveness norm— to distinguish acceptable from unacceptable instances of cognitive exclusion. This framework explains why ignorance of racist or conspiratorial claims can be permissible, while ignoring well-grounded alternatives is not. In non-ideal environments, closed-mindedness then functions as a defense mechanism for proper cognitive functioning, rather than as a vice to be universally condemned.

idealized models of rationality

The frameworks above explore the phenomena of ignorance and unawareness form traditional analytic methods in both the philosophy of mind and epistemology. This paper explores the nature of omissions and ignorance within idealized models, in particular, Bayesian models of rationality.

Non-ideal Inquiry (draft available upon request):

Standard Bayesianism often assumes an ideal epistemic agent—one who never misses relevant information and whose beliefs converge on the truth through Bayesian updating. This paper argues that such models fail to capture the rational norms governing non-ideal inquirers: agents whose attention, evidential uptake, and question-framing are shaped by ideological structures. I show that standard Bayesianism licenses epistemic mistakes as rational when they result from credence-0 assignments—instances where agents exclude hypothesis from consideration. These omissions, common under ideological influence, in fact, prevent convergence on the truth and expose the limits of alethic norms of inquiry. In light of such cognitive limitations, non-ideal inquiry demands a reorientation of epistemic theory to accommodate selective attention, forgetting, and ideological bias, not as anomalies but as central to rational diagnoses.

normative implications for mental architecture

Ignorance matters. In particular, ignorance matters with respect to the kinds of normative demands that are placed on agents when they are ignorant. In the following work I outline how and why these demands arise. In the first article I argue that individuals have particular duties to combat their ignorance. In the second article I provide a detailed account of how ignorance is structurally ‘formative’ in the sense that it robustly influences our cognitive practices.

Epistemic norms and the obligation to combat ignorance. In Jonathan Ichikawa (ed.) Positive Epistemology. Routledge. forthcoming

There are things that we should not believe. These represent our “negative” epistemic duties. There are things that we should believe. These represent our “positive” epistemic duties. Contemporary epistemology tends to construe normativity negatively, with some arguing for a No-Positive-Duties view where agents are constrained by norms that restrict belief but are never required to form them. This paper challenges that assumption. I argue that even within a permissivist framework, epistemic agents can be obligated to combat ignorance. Focusing on perceptual ignorance, cases where individuals overlook features in their perceptual field that are relevant to a live question, I introduce a zetetic constraint that links epistemic obligation to the structure of inquiry. When perceptual features become relevant to an inquirer’s aims and goals, failing to form corresponding beliefs constitutes an epistemic (not merely moral) mistake. This framework accounts for why some forms of ignorance, including systemic cases such as “white ignorance” are rationally indefensible. By grounding epistemic normativity in evidence-responsiveness, the paper shifts the framing of epistemic duties towards a positive epistemic outlook.

Formative Ignorance: a reframing (in preparation):

Various philosophers believe that attitudes that reflect on a person’s normative standing are static—they are (mental) states, and telic—they are completed. In addition, to reflect on a person’s epistemic standing, such attitudes are often said to be reason responsive. Ignorance, traditionally, is neither static nor telic. Instead, ignorance is most notable for being characterized as the absence of an epistemic state, typically achieved unwittingly or unintentionally. Absences are not targets of normativity. They are neither good nor bad. They are neither rational nor irrational. In this paper, I argue for a certain kind of normativity of absences by offering a view of ignorance that is not characterized as the absence of an epistemic state. The view on offer is not a unifying account of ignorance but identifies a species of ignorance we can call Formative Ignorance. Unlike absence ignorance, Formative Ignorance, is evaluable as static, telic, and reason responsive. This is because Formative Ignorance constructs the space of possible answers a person can have while inquiring. This construction, I argue, is not as rationally “hands off” as previously supposed. The upshot of the view is that it extends the normative application of the ethics and epistemology of ignorance by suggesting that certain unintentional processes (e.g., ignorance, omission, and apathy) are nonetheless governed by epistemic evaluation.

templeton foundation grant: humility and inquiry

I am Co-Principal Investigator on a Templeton Foundation grant examining humility in inquiry. I designed and led cross-institutional studies about how doubt, skepticism, and acknowledgment of ignorance contribute to decision-making and learning.

This collaborative work bridges philosophy and psychology, with two articles in preparation for top psychology journals (Nature, Trends in Cognitive Science, Behavioral and Brain Sciences) and philosophy-focuses versions targeted at Mind and Language and Cognition.

Publications in Progress:

1.     Ruth Mayo, Franka Grefer, N. Ángel Pinillos, Elís Miller, Moses Shayo. Rethinking the Congeniality Effect: A Critical Reexamination (draft).

2.     Franka, Grefer, N. Ángel Pinillos, Elis Miller, Ruth Mayo. Fostering Humble Inquiry: Leveraging ‘Don’t Know’ Judgments for Hypothesis Testing (final study in progress to complete draft)